Philadelphia Phillies

Acquisition priorities revised November 1

November 1, 2026 acquisition amendment. This page supersedes conflicting acquisition priorities in the original report. Original edition and roster checks: October 30, 2026. The original 24 pages follow unchanged. This is an editorial reassessment, not a refreshed roster or medical report.

Buy a playable corner bat and late-inning support. Separate shortstop cover from third base.

Philadelphia has less DH flexibility than the Mets. Schwarber already occupies the primary role, so a Suzuki agreement must buy credible everyday corner-outfield work. The report's $22-24 million annual allowance should not be increased on the assumption that a DH fallback will absorb any defensive decline.

Dubon's 456.2 shortstop innings and the report's plus-six OAA at that position support investigating shortstop coverage. His 46 third-base innings do not establish that he is the answer at third. The original report acknowledged that limitation but still installed him as the preferred bridge. That ordering was too strong. Determine the third-base job and its alternatives before committing utility-player money to it.

Decision: Suzuki remains a conditional corner-bat target and Bednar a conditional leverage target. Dubon moves to a contingent shortstop-cover or position-fit inquiry. Do not count his shortstop range as an established third-base improvement. Grichuk remains a limited platoon alternative, with the report's right-handed-pitching weakness exposed. If no third-base solution clears, the vacancy stays unresolved; a nominal utility signing does not close it. Treat the original $10-12 million annual infield line as a conditional reserve. Before that reserve, Plan A allocates $38-44 million, Plan B $23-29 million and Plan C $9-13 million. A funded reserve is not an acquired third baseman or an assumed performance gain.

Read the five-team comparison and sources

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READING GUIDE

Start with the decision. Then test the evidence.

The opening brief states the recommendation and its price. The main analysis tests the roster and the alternatives. The back of the report preserves the player register, definitions and sources.

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A single public edition is suitable for forwarding. The analysis makes no claim of club affiliation or access to private baseball information.

ANALYSIS / 01

The decision

Philadelphia should keep the strength of its rotation and change the shape of the team around it. The best use of the next available dollar is an everyday outfield bat, a flexible infield solution and a second trusted late-inning arm. The club should also reserve enough money and roster space to survive injuries without rushing its best prospects.

That is a targeted retool, with an expensive condition: ownership must approve the whole package before the first major signing. Adding an outfielder and then discovering there is no room for the infield or bullpen work would leave much of the original problem intact.

The preferred acquisition sequence is Seiya Suzuki, Mauricio Dubon and David Bednar, subject to price, role, medical review and any signing compensation. These are recommendations, not reported Phillies negotiations. Our proposed limits are three years and $66-72 million for Suzuki, two years and $20-24 million for Dubon, and two years and $24-28 million for Bednar. Add a $4-6 million first-year depth allowance. Walk away from a fourth guaranteed year for Suzuki or a third for either of the others at these prices. [7,8,9]

Suzuki addresses a recurring lineup problem without requiring regular DH access. Dubon gives the manager a credible alternative at shortstop and a candidate to bridge third base while the young infielders develop. Bednar creates another choice when the most important outs arrive before the ninth. None should be purchased on the assumption that his best recent season will repeat.


Keep Bryson Stott at second base initially. Prepare Trea Turner for an honest shortstop reassessment, with another alignment practiced in advance. Give Justin Crawford a meaningful center-field opportunity, with defined offensive and defensive checkpoints. Allocate no central-case innings to Brad Keller. Do not sell Andrew Painter, Aidan Miller, Bryan Rincon or Gage Wood merely to complete a veteran package. [1,3,5,6,10]

The full preferred plan adds $48-56 million of annual salary assumptions. Combined with the retained-roster allowances in this report, the planning envelope is $307.13-327.13 million before tax, benefits and other excluded costs. That is a request for an ownership decision, not a claim about the Phillies' approved budget. If the envelope is unacceptable, use the less expensive plan before making commitments that close off the alternatives.

The strongest objection is that the club already won 88 games and has considerable money committed. A good portion of the improvement could come from Turner, Realmuto, Painter and the existing bullpen. That possibility deserves room in the plan. It should not be the plan's only source of improvement.

ANALYSIS / 02

Where the margin went



Source: MLB regular-season runs scored minus runs allowed, 2024-2026.

Season	Record	Runs scored	Runs allowed	Difference
2024	95-67	784	671	+113
2025	96-66	778	648	+130
2026	88-74	713	698	+15

Philadelphia lost 115 runs of regular-season margin in one year: 65 fewer scored and 50 more allowed. The offense and run prevention both require attention. The decline cannot be explained by one bad postseason series. [1,2]

The 88-74 record also rested on a 25-16 performance in one-run games. MLB's standings record lists an 83-79 expected record from the season's scoring. That is a description of 2026, not a 2027 forecast. It is a reason to build a larger scoring margin instead of treating 88 wins as a secure starting point. [1]

The club led MLB with 1,577 pitching strikeouts. Its starters produced a 3.80 ERA in 883.1 innings. That is an existing strength worth protecting. Yet the offense ranked 23rd in on-base percentage and 24th in slugging, while relief pitchers allowed 307 runs in 555 innings. Better top-end starting pitching is not the clearest first purchase. More productive plate appearances and better coverage behind the starters are.

The priority is therefore complementary improvement. A stronger lineup can make a competent start sufficient. Better infield coverage can help starters finish an inning without another batter. Another trusted reliever can preserve Duran for the next difficult matchup. These are connected decisions, but their benefits must not be counted twice in a run estimate.

ANALYSIS / 03

Build an offense beyond the two anchors

2026 hitter	PA	OBP / SLG	HR	wOBA / xwOBA
Bryce Harper	693	.380 / .485	29	0.375 / 0.379
Kyle Schwarber	701	.354 / .503	45	0.368 / 0.364
Trea Turner	700	.297 / .378	19	0.298 / 0.293
Bryson Stott	608	.334 / .401	10	0.326 / 0.330
J.T. Realmuto	467	.283 / .331	11	0.275 / 0.317
Brandon Marsh	568	.304 / .408	18	0.308 / 0.301
Justin Crawford	465	.309 / .353	3	0.294 / 0.284

Harper and Schwarber combined for 74 of the team's 182 home runs, 40.7 percent. Their .865 and .857 OPS seasons were valuable, but the lineup could not produce enough around them. Turner, Realmuto and Crawford together took 1,632 plate appearances with an OPS below .700. Those opportunities are large enough to change the team even without another superstar. [2,3]

This is not simply a lineup that needs to face fewer left-handers. Philadelphia posted a .705 OPS against lefties and .707 against righties. Right-handed pitching accounted for 4,164 of 6,079 plate appearances. The first new bat needs to help against righties as well as supply a favorable matchup against lefties. [2]

Suzuki's 2026 split fits that requirement: .345 OBP and .452 slugging against righties over 466 plate appearances, and .429/.537 against lefties over 168. His 81 walks in 634 total plate appearances give the lineup another way to extend an inning. Still, his .366 wOBA exceeded his .340 expected wOBA. Price him as a useful regular with downside, not as a guaranteed repeat of his .841 OPS. [7,9]

Marsh remains useful, but his .258 OBP and .355 slugging against lefties came with 48 strikeouts in 129 plate appearances. A right-handed reserve can take selected starts from that side. Crawford's 66 plate appearances against lefties are too few to settle his long-term role. A platoon should solve today's matchup without automatically denying him the experience needed to improve. [3]

Avoid acquiring another hitter whose value depends on becoming the everyday DH. Schwarber already occupies that role, and occasional rest days for Harper or Realmuto need space too. Suzuki's verified 2026 outfield work is part of his fit. If a candidate's physical or defensive review points toward mostly DH work, the price and the recommendation change.

The lower-order goal is not nine power hitters. It is fewer plate appearances that require Harper or Schwarber to rescue an inning. Walks, playable defense and availability are part of that answer. The club should judge its reserve choices by the complete role they can cover, not the most attractive line on a small-sample batting card.

ANALYSIS / 04

Two different recovery cases

Player	2024 OPS	2025 OPS	2026 OPS	2026 xSLG
Trea Turner	.807	.812	.675	0.363
J.T. Realmuto	.751	.699	.614	0.387
Brandon Marsh	.747	.785	.712	0.401

Turner and Realmuto should not be placed in the same rebound category. Turner's 2026 .675 OPS followed .807 and .812 seasons. His .293 expected wOBA was slightly below his .298 actual wOBA, however. The contact results do not support describing his entire decline as bad luck. Realmuto's .317 expected wOBA was materially above his .275 actual mark, but his OPS has declined in each of the past two seasons. [3,4]

For Turner, begin with pitch selection and the quality of decisions against breaking pitches. Against sliders he produced a .260 wOBA over 106 plate appearances ending on that pitch; against sweepers it was .206 over 74. His whiff rates were 35.5 and 40.1 percent, respectively. Those are diagnostic leads for video and coaching work, not instructions to guess a pitch. Pitch-type results describe the pitch ending the plate appearance and should not be treated as independent full at-bats against an entire sequence. [4]

For Realmuto, a sensible workload and a credible second catcher matter more than assuming an expected-stat rebound will arrive on schedule. Marchan's 95 Philadelphia plate appearances and Stubbs' 65 were not evidence of a dependable offensive alternative. The catching group needs a competitive reserve process and a contingency acquisition allowance. Extra DH appearances are not a costless answer when Schwarber is already there. [3]

Our central playing-time plan assigns Realmuto 420 plate appearances and reserves 220 for other catchers. That is an organizational planning choice, not a medical prescription or a prediction of games caught. The staff should set actual catching workloads from current information, including recovery, throwing and receiving evaluations.

Make the review separate from the contract. A player can remain important to the organization while receiving a different batting-order position, matchup assignment or defensive role. The club's task is to find the most productive work for the player it has now.

ANALYSIS / 05

Fix the infield as a unit

Player	OAA chances	OAA	Range runs	Context
Trea Turner	585	-10	-7	Current SS
Bryson Stott	527	+9	+7	Current 2B
Bryce Harper	340	-9	-8	Current 1B
Alec Bohm	435	-11	-8	Free agent, former 3B
Edmundo Sosa	210	+4	+3	Free agent, mixed roles
Brandon Marsh	284	-1	-1	Current outfield
Justin Crawford	283	-2	-2	Current CF
Seiya Suzuki	263	+5	+4	Free-agent target
Mauricio Dubon	449	+6	+5	Free-agent target, mixed roles

Stott's plus-nine OAA is a reason to preserve an advantage at second base. Turner's minus-ten is a reason to create a real alternative at shortstop. Moving Turner to second without accounting for Stott's replacement role can shift the problem rather than solve it. [5]

Dubon is attractive because his 2026 record includes 456.2 innings at shortstop, with plus-six OAA at that position. His overall plus-six includes several positions; it is not six runs and it is not a third-base grade. He played only 46 innings at third. The proposed third-base bridge therefore requires a preseason position-specific evaluation. [5,7]

Begin with Stott at second, Turner at short and Dubon as the third-base candidate if signed. Practice Dubon at short and a Turner third-base alternative before either becomes necessary. This is an option to evaluate, not a claim that Turner will immediately be a good third baseman. If the third-base alternative is unsound, retain a separate corner-infield solution rather than improvise a new alignment during a losing stretch.

When Miller or Rincon earns a major-league opportunity, decide the alignment from the combined value of all four infield positions. Do not force Miller to third solely to protect a veteran's current position. Do not force Stott to short solely because he has played there before. Evaluate current range, throwing, receiving and the likely loss at the vacated position.

OAA estimates how many outs a fielder made above or below an average player given the opportunities. The range-runs column translates that range component into runs; it does not measure every part of defense. One season, particularly one small positional sample, is not a complete scouting report. The direction here is supported by opportunity-adjusted evidence, not error totals or fielding percentage alone.

Harper's minus-nine OAA at first also belongs in the review. Better shortstop play does not erase every infield weakness. Receiving, positioning and specific plays should be examined separately, without assuming the public range figure identifies the mechanical cause. The goal is a better unit, measured over meaningful chances, not a promise that one position change recovers a fixed number of wins.

ANALYSIS / 06

Protect the rotation, improve its floor

2026 pitcher	IP	ERA / xERA	K / BB	HR allowed
Cristopher Sanchez	207.0	2.91 / 3.39	231 / 45	19
Jesus Luzardo	179.2	2.86 / 2.83	221 / 52	15
Zack Wheeler	162.0	3.00 / 2.88	193 / 47	21
Aaron Nola	175.1	4.67 / 4.18	177 / 59	37
Andrew Painter	126.2	5.40 / 4.42	115 / 47	21

Sanchez, Luzardo and Wheeler supplied 548.2 innings with ERAs below 3.01. Keeping that foundation makes more sense than breaking it up to solve an outfield or infield need. Their central allocation here totals 515 innings, leaving room for fewer innings than last year rather than requiring perfect availability. [3]

Nola's 175.1 innings remain useful volume, but 37 home runs and a 4.67 ERA made the quality expensive. His 4.18 xERA suggests a less severe contact-based outcome than the actual ERA; it does not remove the home-run problem. The pitch-level record points toward work on the fastball family. Batters produced .441 wOBA against his four-seamer and .444 against his sinker, compared with .257 against the curveball. [3,4]

That is a reason for a detailed location, count and sequencing review. It is not enough to tell him to throw more curves. Different pitches face different counts and hitters, and a pitch can lose effectiveness when its use becomes predictable. The club should test changes with its own pitch-quality and video evidence, then judge whether damaging contact is actually falling.

Painter's full-season 5.40 ERA obscures a better finish: his last 11 regular-season appearances covered 61.2 innings with 25 earned runs, a calculated 3.65 ERA. His overall 4.42 xERA also was better than his actual ERA. Both support patience. Neither establishes that the final two months are his new full-season level. [3,4]

His four-seamer produced a .429 opposing wOBA over 188 plate appearances ending on the pitch. His changeup produced .197 over 73. The development question is whether he can make the fastball a better part of the sequence while preserving what works elsewhere. A 145-inning central allocation is an increase over 126.2 in 2026, with a broad 115-165 planning range and replacement innings already assigned.

Do not allocate Wood a full major-league season to make the spreadsheet work. Purchase or develop a genuine depth route that can deliver starts before a prospect is ready. The same depth must cover an early injury to a veteran. If one pitcher is assigned both the fifth rotation place and emergency relief, his innings cannot appear in both pools.

ANALYSIS / 07

Give the manager another late-inning choice

2026 pitcher	IP*	ERA / xERA	K / BB	2027 planning role
Jhoan Duran	59.1	1.82 / 2.06	84 / 10	Highest-leverage anchor
Tim Mayza	67.1	3.48 / 3.47	64 / 18	Returning left-hander
Jonathan Bowlan	56.1	3.36 / 2.85	73 / 15	Meaningful bridge role
Orion Kerkering	58.0	4.97 / 3.87	63 / 34	Earn leverage through command
Chase Shugart	53.2	4.02 / 3.78	59 / 20	Middle innings
Tanner Banks	36.1	6.19 / 4.21	38 / 15	Long relief / competition
Brad Keller	31.1	4.02 / 3.37	32 / 13	No central-case innings

*Player lines include all Philadelphia pitching appearances, including any starts. The team relief-only total is separate: 555 innings, 273 earned runs and a 4.43 ERA. [2,3]

Duran's 1.82 ERA, 84 strikeouts and ten walks over 59.1 innings are a strong foundation. The problem is the distance between that foundation and the rest of the game. A club that relies on one elite reliever must either use him earlier and expose the ninth or save him and risk losing the lead before he enters.

Bednar is the preferred outside addition at our price. He recorded a 2.47 ERA with 76 strikeouts and 20 walks in 69.1 innings in 2026. The value is another credible high-leverage option, not a rigid promise that one man pitches the eighth and another the ninth. His role preferences and price could make this pairing unavailable. If so, keep the spending limit and search for the role rather than buy a name at any cost. [7,8]

Mayza re-signed for 2027. His reported salary is $2.75 million. He is already in the baseline, not a future acquisition. Keller's July elbow surgery makes him unsuitable for central-case innings. Keep his committed salary in the plan. [11,12,13]

Bowlan's 73 strikeouts against 15 walks in 56.1 innings warrant meaningful work. Kerkering's 34 walks in 58 innings warrant a command requirement before regular high-leverage assignment. His 3.87 xERA, compared with a 4.97 ERA, supports further evaluation; it does not explain away free baserunners. Banks, Shugart, Backhus and the optionable group should compete for specific coverage needs. [3,4]

Write the daily plan around availability and the next difficult pocket of hitters. Maintain a credible path for a third straight close game and for a short start. A second leverage signing is only useful if the rest of the bullpen is not repeatedly exhausted covering missing length.

ANALYSIS / 08

Every inning and plate appearance has one home

Season assignment	Planning range	Central IP
Sanchez	170-210	190
Luzardo	140-190	170
Wheeler	120-180	155
Nola	130-185	160
Painter	115-165	145
Other starts / bulk innings	60-170	100
Duran	55-75	65
Mayza	45-70	60
Bowlan	45-75	60
Kerkering	30-65	50
Acquired leverage reliever	50-75	65
Shugart	35-65	50
Banks	20-60	35
Other relief / rotating depth	80-210	135
Total; ranges are not additive		1440

The 1,440-inning central case is a planning denominator, not the exact length of a future season. Individual ranges are independent stress ranges and must not be added together. Other starts and bulk innings include acquired depth and internal competition. The other-relief pool can involve several players over the season, not a 135-inning promise to one eighth reliever.

Plan A season allocation	PA
Harper	650
Schwarber	660
Turner	620
Stott	590
Suzuki, if signed	600
Marsh	430
Crawford	500
Dubon, if signed	450

Plan A season allocation	PA
Realmuto	420
Other catcher appearances	220
Other outfield appearances	300
Other infield appearances	250
Unassigned development / injury cover	410
Total planning denominator	6100

The 6,100-PA allocation is slightly above Philadelphia's 6,079 in 2026. The final 410 appearances remain unassigned so the plan can absorb injury, development and performance changes. They are not a second allocation for Miller, Rincon or an existing reserve. A promotion takes appearances from a named pool or another player; it does not expand the total. [2,3]

Position	Plan A lead	Coverage / condition
C	Realmuto	Marchan competes; third-catcher protection
1B	Harper	Kemp / cross-trained corner reserve
2B	Stott	Dubon coverage if signed
SS	Turner, conditional	Dubon if signed; planned reassessment
3B	Dubon if signed	Kemp; Miller / Rincon only when ready
LF	Marsh	Right-handed reserve versus selected lefties
CF	Crawford	Hill; verified healthy Rojas only later
RF	Suzuki if signed	Rincones / De La Cruz competition
DH	Schwarber	Rest rotation; no second full-time DH

This is a conditional Plan A alignment, not a completed roster. Suzuki and Dubon are free agents. The reserve competition also needs a genuine shortstop backup, a second catcher and center-field coverage. Administrative active-roster labels in October do not settle Opening Day assignments.

ANALYSIS / 09

The farm can change the plan, but cannot be its insurance policy

Player / level	Sample	Results	Decision use
Miller / AA	11 PA	.364 OBP / .500 SLG	11 PA cannot establish readiness
Rincon / AA	534 PA	.410 OBP / .517 SLG	Earn Triple-A and MLB opportunity
Wood / AA	68.2 IP	4.72 ERA / 99 K	Depth candidate; no guaranteed slot
Wood / A	26.1 IP	3.42 ERA / 40 K	Separate 26.1-IP sample
Rincones / AAA	179 PA	.335 OBP / .433 SLG	Corner competition
Kemp / AAA	455 PA	.334 OBP / .402 SLG	Infield bridge competition
Thomas / AAA	122 PA	.207 OBP / .223 SLG	Small, difficult local sample
Reyes / AAA	380 PA	.318 OBP / .511 SLG	Power depth; current IL60

The most useful development distinction is between ability, readiness and available workload. A prospect can be highly regarded without being ready to cover a major-league vacancy in April. [6,10]

Miller's 2026 regular-season record contains three plate appearances at Clearwater and 11 at Reading. His back injury cost development time. Those tiny samples cannot support a full-season major-league batting assumption. His fall assignment is an opportunity to rebuild a playing routine and gather evidence, not a substitute for the missed season. [6,10]

Use three readiness gates: sustained availability for the planned workload, competitive decisions against upper-level pitching, and usable defense at the position he would actually play. Do not make an arbitrary batting-average threshold the promotion rule. An extended period of strong decisions with modest hit results can be more informative than a short hot streak.

Rincon's 534 Double-A plate appearances, .410 OBP, 26 home runs and 95 walks give the club another substantive infield candidate. The next question is how those decisions and damage carry into tougher pitching. His .517 slugging is not a major-league projection. Give him a route to regular work at the next level rather than a major-league bench promise. [6]

Wood threw 95 regular-season innings across Clearwater and Reading. The Double-A portion had 99 strikeouts and 18 walks in 68.2 innings, alongside 14 home runs. That combination deserves a specific contact-quality review, not simply praise for strikeouts. The 95-inning denominator excludes postseason and exhibition work. A rotation-depth role is earned by both readiness and an available workload. [6]

Rincones, Kemp and Thomas should compete on current evidence. Their local Triple-A lines differ materially, and Thomas' 122 Lehigh Valley plate appearances must not be presented as his entire organizational season. Reyes' 21 home runs in 380 Triple-A plate appearances are interesting, but his current injured-list status prevents an unconditional roster assignment. [1,6]

Protect Miller, Rincon and Wood from a trade made merely to avoid a short-term veteran overpay. That does not make any prospect untouchable in every conceivable deal. It means a trade must offer enough durable major-league value to justify the opportunity cost. No outside asking price or prospect package is presumed.

ANALYSIS / 10

A small acquisition list with explicit limits

Free-agent candidate / MLB ID	2026 MLB evidence	S&S proposed limit
Seiya Suzuki / 673548	634 PA; .368 OBP; 26 HR	3 years / $66-72M
Mauricio Dubon / 643289	619 PA; .321 OBP; 12 HR	2 years / $20-24M
David Bednar / 670280	69.1 IP; 2.47 ERA; 76 K / 20 BB	2 years / $24-28M
Randal Grichuk / 545341	280 PA; .314 OBP; 15 HR	1 year / $7-9M, fallback
Edmundo Sosa / 624641	250 PA; .283 OBP; 9 HR	1 year / $6-8M, infield fallback

All five candidates are free agents in the October 29 transaction records. Last-club labels in player databases do not mean they remain on those clubs' active rosters. The proposed figures are S&S negotiating limits, not agent demands, market forecasts or actual offers. Signing compensation, incentives, physical findings and role agreement still require a transaction-specific review. [8]

Suzuki is the primary everyday outfield target. His .368 OBP, 26 home runs and plus-five outfield OAA in 2026 offer a combination this lineup needs. The smaller expected-stat line is the caution. The contract should survive a season closer to his .340 xwOBA, with a late-game defensive replacement available if his range slips. There is no standing DH escape hatch. [7,9]

Dubon is the preferred infield bridge. He produced a .720 OPS in 619 plate appearances and can supply an alternative at shortstop. His .743 OPS against righties in 409 plate appearances is a useful contrast to Sosa's .564 in 112. Those are single-season splits, not permanent platoon identities. Dubon's limited recent third-base workload is a condition to evaluate before committing to that role. [7]

Bednar is a leverage purchase. At two years and $24-28 million, the club is paying for another trusted choice without attaching a long contract to a volatile role. If the market requires a third guaranteed year, or a closer-only role conflicts with the proposed usage, move to a different reliever inside the allowance. [7]

Grichuk is a lower-cost outfield alternative, not an equivalent substitute for Suzuki. His 2026 combined-team split was .371 OBP and .655 slugging against lefties in 178 plate appearances, but .216/.420 against righties in 102. A plan built around him needs credible coverage for the majority of plate appearances against right-handed pitching. It should not advertise an everyday upgrade on the basis of the favorable half of the split. [7]

Sosa is an infield fallback at one year and $6-8 million. His defensive versatility has value, but his 2026 .283 OBP and seven walks in 250 plate appearances argue against paying him as a complete offensive answer. Re-signing Bohm would preserve familiarity, but a .698 OPS and minus-11 OAA season do not justify treating the vacancy as automatically solved. [3,5]

Before any agreement, examine the full acquisition cost, including draft or international-pool effects if a qualifying offer applies. The dossier does not assume those future decisions have been made. The club should compare candidates after those costs are known, with one common playing-time baseline.

ANALYSIS / 11

The money: three plans, one baseline

2027 salary planning component	$M	Basis
Harper	27.54	Through 2031
Turner	27.27	Through 2033
Nola	24.57	Through 2030
Schwarber	33.00	Through 2030
Luzardo	27.00	Through 2031; later option
Wheeler	42.00	Through 2027
Sanchez	7.00	Through 2032; later option
Realmuto	15.00	Through 2028; incentives excluded
Brad Keller	13.00	Through 2027; workload excluded
Mayza	2.75	2027; reported annual salary
Known listed commitments	219.13	Mixed salary / prorated-bonus presentation
Retained arbitration pool	32-42	S&S allowance; cases unresolved
Pre-arbitration / call-up allowance	8-10	Planning reserve; not a minimum-salary ruling
Baseline planning envelope	259.13-271.13	Before outside additions / tax / benefits

The first nine annual figures use Baseball-Reference's listed salary and prorated-bonus presentation. Mayza's $2.75 million is a separately reported annual salary. The $219.13 million sum is an approximate planning base across those presentations, not a cash-disbursement schedule or competitive-balance-tax calculation. Realmuto incentives, other earned bonuses, benefits, tax, transaction costs and any unlisted obligations are excluded. Rounding in the source also limits precision. [12,14]

The $32-42 million arbitration allowance is an S&S scenario for retaining the relevant group, including a contingency for unsettled eligibility. It covers Duran, Stott, Marsh, Kerkering, Marchan, Stubbs, De La Cruz, Hill, Banks and a Rojas contingency. It is not an arbitration forecast or a promise that all are tendered. The separate $8-10 million pre-arbitration and call-up allowance is a budgeting reserve, not a claim about the 2027 minimum salary. [1,15]

Plan	2027 additions	Planning envelope	New guarantees*
A: Suzuki + Dubon + Bednar + depth	$48-56M	$307.13-327.13M	$114-130M
B: Grichuk + Dubon + Bednar + depth	$33-41M	$292.13-312.13M	$55-67M
C: Dubon + value relief + depth	$19-25M	$278.13-296.13M	$29-37M

*New guarantees sum the proposed contract terms and a one-year depth allowance. They exclude incentives, tax and signing compensation. Planning envelopes conservatively retain the baseline allowances; no speculative trade or non-tender savings are credited. They are not Opening Day 26-man payrolls.

Plan A is recommended if the complete cost clears ownership review. Its $48-56 million annual additions are Suzuki at $22-24 million, Dubon at $10-12 million, Bednar at $12-14 million, and depth at $4-6 million. It attacks three different weaknesses while preserving the starting-pitching foundation.

Plan B replaces Suzuki with Grichuk at $7-9 million for one year, retaining Dubon, Bednar and the depth allowance. It saves $15 million in annual additions at either end of the range, but asks much more of the existing outfield against righties. Treat it as a lower-upside compromise, not the same team bought cleverly for less.

Plan C adds Dubon, a $5-7 million one-year relief allowance and $4-6 million of depth. It preserves more flexibility but largely relies on internal offensive recovery. If this is the approved envelope, say plainly that the roster has more unresolved performance risk. Do not spend the first $20 million as though another $30 million is certain to follow.

THE FALLBACK SAVES MONEY, NOT THE SAME TEAM



Annual additions, including depth. Tax and other excluded costs are separate.

Source: S&S proposed spending ranges. October 30, 2026. Not club offers.

Wheeler's listed $42 million and Keller's $13 million are scheduled to come off this annual presentation after 2027. That $55 million is not automatically free spending money: their roles may need replacement, other salaries change, and labor terms may change. The contract horizon creates choices, not a reason to spend the same future dollar twice.

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What improvement must actually look like

A BETTER TEAM STILL NEEDS INJURY COVER



Run differential. Scenarios are outcome tests, not win forecasts.

Source: S&S assumptions using MLB 2026 baseline. October 30, 2026.

These are outcome tests, not player projections or probability-weighted forecasts. The strong-execution case asks the team to score 40 more runs and allow 25 fewer than in 2026. That would restore 65 of the 115 runs of margin lost from 2025, leaving the club below its 2025 differential. [1,2]

The 40-run offensive gain must come from the combined result of better outside production, fewer weak reserve appearances and selected internal improvement. Do not add a free agent's full historical WAR to last year's wins, then also credit the same improvement to lineup depth. His plate appearances replace somebody else's.

The 25-run prevention gain must similarly be shared among relief, defense and starting-pitching outcomes. A ball converted into an out can improve the fielder's result and the pitcher's ERA; it is still one event. The public data cannot establish a precise causal division between those components.

The injury stress test replaces 100 innings at a 3.50 run rate with innings at 5.50, costing 22.2 runs. Rounded to whole runs, the strong case becomes 753 scored and 695 allowed, a plus-58 margin. Those rates are illustrative runs per nine innings, not ERA projections for named pitchers. The calculation shows why depth can matter as much as another high-ceiling addition.

There is also a real downside case: 15 fewer runs scored and 20 more allowed produces a minus-20 differential. That can happen if older hitters decline, a new signing disappoints and pitching availability deteriorates together. The club needs an in-season decision process for that outcome, not a report that only describes the preferred path.

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The first 100 days of execution

First, approve the full spending envelope and the walk-away terms. Separate the three primary roles so a failed negotiation does not collapse the entire winter. Confirm current availability, compensation conditions and health information before valuing any final offer.

Second, establish the infield alternatives before camp. If Dubon signs, evaluate his third-base fit and practice the shortstop contingency. Keep Stott's second-base value in the comparison. Agree on how the staff will assess Turner so the decision does not arrive as a surprise after a bad week.

Third, give each pitcher a defined development question. Nola's fastball contact, Painter's fastball integration and Kerkering's strike throwing deserve different plans. Track the intended change and the result separately. A lower ERA without the intended improvement should not end the investigation; a short run of bad results should not erase a sound change.

Fourth, make the reserve competition cover the actual roster. A bench of interesting bats is incomplete without a second catcher, shortstop coverage and a playable center fielder. Keep one depth path that does not require a top prospect to arrive early. Verify option and roster flexibility before assigning a shuttle role.

After roughly six rotation turns, review availability, workload and pitch-quality evidence together. After roughly 150-200 plate appearances for a regular, revisit the offensive role using decisions and contact quality as well as results. These are proposed management checkpoints, not statistical thresholds that prove a player has changed. Defensive review needs opportunities and video, not merely a calendar date.

If the acquired bat becomes mostly a DH candidate, revisit the fit immediately. If the infield contingency fails its position-specific evaluation, acquire coverage before depending on it. If Miller or Rincon earns a promotion, name the playing-time source and the displaced role. If the club is struggling, separate reversible decisions from commitments that would consume future seasons or premium prospects.

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The business case is retention of value

Philadelphia lists attendance of 3,230,531 in 2026 and 3,375,477 in 2025. The decline is 144,946, or 4.3 percent. [16]

That remains a substantial audience. It does not reveal ticket yield, concessions margin, sponsorship value, media receipts or club profit. It would be misleading to multiply the attendance decline by an assumed ticket price and call the result lost revenue.

The strategic business argument is narrower and stronger. An expensive core already requires substantial investment. The next spending decision should improve the performance and resilience of that investment, while avoiding contracts that crowd out the next roster transition. A complementary player can have greater practical value than a more famous player whose best role is already occupied.

Ownership should receive the complete first-year cash, tax and operating effect from its own financial records before approving Plan A. The public report supplies a salary planning envelope and baseball trade-offs. It cannot establish an internal return on investment. The less expensive plans are included so the decision remains useful if the full envelope is rejected.

Preserve flexibility where it has a purpose: a position that may soon be earned by a prospect, a rotation vacancy after 2027, or an in-season injury response. Flexibility that never turns into a useful roster move has little baseball value. Conversely, spending every available dollar in November can leave the manager with no credible response in June.

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The strongest case against our recommendation

The Phillies could make a reasonable case for a lighter winter. Turner has a long record of better offense. Realmuto's expected contact results were better than his actual line. Painter finished strongly. Bowlan and Duran give the bullpen genuine strength. Internal improvement would cost less than buying the full preferred package. [3,4]

There are acquisition risks too. Suzuki will play his age-32 season in 2027, and his actual 2026 production exceeded the expected-stat line. Dubon's third-base sample is limited, and his preferred role may be elsewhere. Bednar could command more money or insist on a different usage pattern. The proposed prices may not win any of the negotiations. [7,9]

The objection becomes strongest if ownership sets a firm lower ceiling, a prospect clears the readiness gates sooner than expected, or the market prices the three preferred roles above our limits. Under those conditions, switch plans. Do not inflate the proposed ceiling merely to preserve the original names.

Our answer is that the lighter-winter case asks several uncertain improvements to arrive together. Turner's offense and defense must recover. The catching group must become more productive. Crawford must improve while covering center. The bullpen must bridge more reliably. The rotation must remain sufficiently available. Each is possible. Their combined success is less secure than any single story sounds on its own.

The recommendation therefore buys help in three places while keeping the rotation and development opportunities. It accepts that the club may pay for a year that is merely solid. It rejects a plan whose economics work only if every veteran rebounds and every prospect arrives on time.

Philadelphia's next advantage is a roster with more usable answers: another hitter who can reach base and do damage, another infielder who makes the alignment a choice, another reliever trusted with important outs, and enough depth to keep a setback from becoming a season-long problem.

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Current roster register

Official 40-man roster query dated October 30, 2026. It returns 37 names, including four marked 60-day injured list. These administrative designations are reported as observed, not interpreted as Opening Day availability. The sample column contains Philadelphia-only 2026 regular-season totals. [1,3]

Current player / MLB ID	Official status	2026 Philadelphia sample
Aaron Nola / 605400	Active	175.1 IP; 4.67 ERA
Alan Rangel / 660604	Active	26.0 IP; 5.88 ERA
Alex McFarlane / 686934	Active	19.0 IP; 2.84 ERA
Andrew Hoffmann / 694851	Active	No 2026 Philadelphia MLB sample
Andrew Painter / 691725	Active	126.2 IP; 5.40 ERA
Brad Keller / 641745	Injured 60-Day	31.1 IP; 4.02 ERA
Brandon Marsh / 669016	Active	568 PA; .712 OPS
Bryan De La Cruz / 650559	Active	86 PA; .762 OPS
Bryce Harper / 547180	Active	693 PA; .865 OPS
Bryson Stott / 681082	Active	608 PA; .735 OPS
Caleb Kilian / 668873	Injured 60-Day	3.1 IP; 13.50 ERA
Chase Shugart / 663767	Active	53.2 IP; 4.02 ERA
Colby Thomas / 687515	Active	No 2026 Philadelphia MLB sample
Cristopher Sanchez / 650911	Active	207.0 IP; 2.91 ERA
Derek Hill / 656537	Active	126 PA; .783 OPS
Felix Reyes / 694025	Injured 60-Day	38 PA; .421 OPS
Gabriel Rincones Jr. / 687282	Active	89 PA; .488 OPS
Garrett Stubbs / 596117	Active	65 PA; .368 OPS
Grant Holman / 680880	Active	0.1 IP; 0.00 ERA
J.T. Realmuto / 592663	Active	467 PA; .614 OPS
Jesus Luzardo / 666200	Active	179.2 IP; 2.86 ERA
Jhoan Duran / 661395	Active	59.1 IP; 1.82 ERA
Johan Rojas / 679032	Injured 60-Day	No 2026 Philadelphia MLB sample
Jonathan Bowlan / 680742	Active	56.1 IP; 3.36 ERA
Justin Crawford / 702222	Active	465 PA; .662 OPS
Kameron Misner / 670224	Active	No 2026 Philadelphia MLB sample

Current player / MLB ID	Official status	2026 Philadelphia sample
Kyle Backhus / 679775	Active	20.0 IP; 4.95 ERA
Kyle Schwarber / 656941	Active	701 PA; .857 OPS
Max Lazar / 676661	Active	10.0 IP; 6.30 ERA
Moises Chace / 691330	Active	No 2026 Philadelphia MLB sample
Orion Kerkering / 689147	Active	58.0 IP; 4.97 ERA
Otto Kemp / 805249	Active	27 PA; .228 OPS
Rafael Marchan / 665561	Active	95 PA; .302 OPS
Tanner Banks / 621383	Active	36.1 IP; 6.19 ERA
Tim Mayza / 641835	Active	67.1 IP; 3.48 ERA
Trea Turner / 607208	Active	700 PA; .675 OPS
Zack Wheeler / 554430	Active	162.0 IP; 3.00 ERA

The roster log, player record and current organization are reconciled separately. A last-club field alone does not establish employment or active status. The named minor-league candidates are Miller (805795), Wood (805906) and Rincon (804858), each in the Philadelphia organization; they are not included among the 37 current MLB-roster names. Miller's current assignment is Surprise in the Arizona Fall League. [1,6,10]

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Departures and scope

2026 contributor	Philadelphia 2026 sample	October 30 status
Alec Bohm	629 PA; .698 OPS	Elected free agency Oct. 29
Edmundo Sosa	250 PA; .712 OPS	Elected free agency Oct. 29
Luis Arraez	191 PA; .678 OPS	Elected free agency Oct. 29
Adolis Garcia	259 PA; .599 OPS	Elected free agency Oct. 29
Jose Alvarado	58.1 IP; 5.86 ERA	Elected free agency Oct. 29
Brooks Raley	11.1 IP; 7.94 ERA	Elected free agency Oct. 29

Nestor Cortes also elected free agency on October 29. The table separates historical contribution from the returning roster; it does not recommend re-signing every departure. Mayza is different: the club announced his one-year return in October, so he remains in the baseline. [1,11]

All major-league performance comparisons use the completed 2026 regular season unless another season is labeled. Combined-team totals are labeled when used for an outside candidate. Minor-league levels and local team samples remain separate. Postseason results do not enter the regular-season tables.

Pitching notation is baseball notation: .1 is one out and .2 is two outs. The models calculate from outs before rounding. OAA, range runs, ERA, xERA, wOBA and xwOBA measure different things. Expected statistics describe contact and related outcomes under their published definitions; they are not 2027 projections. Historical performance is evidence for judgment, not a promise of future production.

Prices, role allocations, readiness gates, spending envelopes and run scenarios are Stadium & Street proposals. No private medical information, club valuation model, scouting access, agent demand, inside trade conversation or endorsement is claimed. This report is independent analysis available to readers and baseball decision-makers on the same terms.

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Sources and reading notes

[1] Official roster, transactions and standings

October 30 roster; October 29 free-agent elections. Companion StatsAPI team 143 roster, transaction and standings snapshots.

Open source

[2] MLB team statistics and role / handedness splits

Completed 2024-2026 regular seasons. StatsAPI team totals for all 30 clubs; Philadelphia starter/reliever and batting-handedness splits.

Open source

[3] MLB player statistics and game logs

Philadelphia-only totals; 2024-2025 comparisons and Painter regular-season game log retained separately. Player IDs appear in the roster register.

Open source

[4] Baseball Savant expected and pitch-type statistics

2026 batter and pitcher expected-stat tables, plus pitch-arsenal results. Pitch-type plate appearances end on the named pitch.

Open source

[5] Statcast range defense

2026 OAA, opportunities, positional splits and range runs. Mixed-position totals are labeled.

Open source

[6] Official affiliated minor-league statistics

Reading 522/AA, Lehigh Valley 1410/AAA, Jersey Shore 427/High-A and Clearwater 566/A. Local team and regular-season samples only.

Open source

[7] MLB outside-candidate player and split records

Suzuki, Dubon, Bednar, Grichuk and Sosa; 2026 totals and handedness/position evidence. Grichuk totals combine clubs.

Open source

[8] Official transaction records for acquisition status

October 29 free-agent elections checked against club records: Cubs 112, Braves 144, Yankees 147, White Sox 145 and Phillies 143.

Open source

[9] Statcast outside-candidate expected and range evidence

Companion 2026 expected-stat and OAA tables supply Suzuki contact-quality and outfield-range comparisons.

Open source

[10] MLB Pipeline and Phillies prospect reporting

Current organizational identities and levels; Aidan Miller injury/development context also checked in MLB.com reports dated October 13 and October 23.

Open source

[11] MLB.com: Mayza returns on a one-year deal

October 16, 2026 club announcement report. This resolves an omission in the transaction-feed snapshot.

Open source

[12] The Philadelphia Inquirer: Mayza contract reporting

October 26, 2026. Reported 2027 salary of $2.75 million; not a public contract document.

Open source

[13] MLB.com: Phillies injury updates

October 2 page, with dated individual updates. Keller workload exclusion reflects the reported July surgery; no private medical assessment.

Open source

[14] Baseball-Reference salary and contract table

October 30 listed annual salary / prorated-bonus amounts. The report builds its own arbitration and depth allowances instead of using the generic headline estimate.

Open source

[15] MLB.com: Phillies offseason decisions

October 27, 2026. Arbitration group and unresolved Rojas eligibility context; current roster status is separately checked.

Open source

[16] Phillies year-by-year results and attendance

Club historical table, checked October 30. Figures are attendance, not revenue or profit.

Open source

[17] Primary contract reporting

Sanchez: March 22, 2026. Also checked MLB.com reports for Luzardo (March 10), Realmuto (January 20), Schwarber (December 10, 2025), and Keller (December 18, 2025). Annual listed salary amounts are distinct from total guarantees and options.

Open source

[18] Statcast definitions

OAA and expected-stat definitions. The analysis does not treat expected contact statistics as projections or range runs as all defensive value.

Open source

All source checks in this edition were performed October 30, 2026. Original report and transaction dates are preserved above. The downloadable report and web edition use the same research cutoff.