Protect Arizona's pitching gains

Buy enough depth to protect the progress

Arizona allowed 55 fewer runs in 2026 and won six more games. That was real progress. The offense, however, scored 52 fewer runs, leaving the Diamondbacks with only a plus-9 run differential. An 86-win finish gives the club a reason to improve carefully. It does not give the next roster much room to absorb another offensive decline.

The preferred plan adds Nathaniel Lowe at first base and retains Michael Soroka, Jonathan Loaisiga and Kevin Ginkel. Including a $6-8 million reserve, those choices require $33-43 million in annual additions and a total player-allocation envelope of about $191.48-205.48 million. The proposed new commitments total $41-53 million, because Loaisiga's proposed deal spans two years. These are S&S negotiating limits and planning assumptions, not reported offers or an authorized club budget.

The plan pays Corbin Burnes in full but does not require his recovery to supply the initial 162-start budget. A separate return scenario gives him 16 starts and 80 innings while reducing young pitchers' assignments. That approach costs more than simply assuming the expensive veteran will return to form. It also makes the principal risk visible: Arizona needs a complete pitching staff whether Burnes is ready or not.

The six-win improvement needs a stronger foundation

The three-year record shows two different versions of Arizona's problem. The 2024 club scored 886 runs and allowed 788. The 2026 team scored 739 and allowed 730. Better prevention has been accompanied by a much smaller offensive cushion. The winter should protect the defensive and pitching progress while repairing identifiable weaknesses in the lineup.

The 2026 starting pitchers supplied 864.1 innings with a 4.28 ERA. Relievers added 577.2 innings with a 4.07 ERA. That bullpen contained several excellent individual performances, but the aggregate was not so strong that Arizona can replace every departing veteran with an untested arm. The preferred plan retains two relievers and still asks a substantial group of internal pitchers to contribute.

A simple squared-run ratio converts 739 scored and 730 allowed into about 82 wins over 162 games. Arizona actually won 86. The formula does not capture every feature of how those games unfolded. Its useful warning is that a narrow run margin leaves little protection against injuries, weaker sequencing or the departure of productive players.

The roster after the option and free-agent decisions

The current official roster page and data feed both contain 33 names. Soroka is a free agent after declining his mutual option. Smith was outrighted on November 2 and elected free agency, as confirmed by the current MLB transaction record and Arizona's November 3 update. Neither player belongs in the retained roster without a new agreement.

Smith receives no plate appearances or projected 2027 arbitration salary in the preferred roster. His confirmed free agency removes the $2.5 million prospective salary provision. This changes the modeled allocation, not a claim about payment of any prior-year obligation.

The raw feed also contains injured-list designations for Cristian Mena, Andrew Saalfrank and Tyler Locklear. An administrative restoration does not establish readiness. Mena and Saalfrank have no innings in the opening plan. Locklear receives a limited, conditional first-base opportunity with a complete replacement branch if his thumb recovery prevents it. Four proposed signings or retentions would take the 33-name research pool to 37 before any additional prospect selections.

The lineup has a valuable center

Gabriel Moreno produced a .874 OPS in 549 plate appearances, with 16 home runs, 61 walks and 80 strikeouts. Geraldo Perdomo walked 96 times against 86 strikeouts. Corbin Carroll and Ketel Marte each hit 22 home runs. Those are different ways to sustain an offense, and they give Arizona several players around whom to arrange the next lineup.

Nolan Arenado's 30 home runs and .806 OPS were important to the 2026 offense. His season also illustrates why historical results and expected future contribution require separate treatment. The contact data in the next section are considerably less enthusiastic than his actual slugging percentage. The roster can retain his role while creating enough rest and corner-infield depth to avoid relying on a repeat of every home run.

Lars Nootbaar's Arizona segment was only 151 plate appearances. The .762 OPS in that segment should not silently replace his full-season record when evaluating the player. The same distinction applies to departed players in the historical table. Ildemaro Vargas, James McCann, Lourdes Gurriel Jr. and Max Kepler help explain how Arizona assembled its 2026 totals; none is assigned a retained regular job here.

Moreno's production is supported; Arenado's needs caution

Moreno's .380 wOBA exceeded his .363 expected mark, but both describe strong offensive production. Carroll's actual and expected wOBA were both .341. Perdomo's .336 and .333 were also close. Those comparisons support a lineup built around the existing core without treating every difference between actual and expected results as a future correction.

Arenado's .349 wOBA was well above his .300 expected mark, and his .475 slugging percentage exceeded a .366 expected figure. Marte presents the opposite case: .323 actual wOBA against .349 expected. Nootbaar also had a stronger contact-based estimate than actual result. The useful response is to investigate which skills remain stable, rather than adding projected rebounds and subtracting projected declines with false precision.

Expected statistics describe observed contact and related inputs. They do not provide a complete forecast of health, playing time, baserunning or team run production. Arizona's preferred first-base purchase is deliberately modest because the club already has plausible internal offensive improvement. The purchase should cover a weak job, not consume the resources needed to keep the pitching staff functional.

Use the matchup evidence without building a fragile platoon

The three-year table places the current season in a larger sample. A good year from a veteran is more convincing when supported by repeated skills. A young hitter's short major-league opportunity is informative, but it does not become a dependable 600-plate-appearance projection because the club needs a convenient answer.

Lowe's 2026 splits were sharply uneven: a .296 OPS in 49 plate appearances against left-handers and .822 in 380 against right-handers. That small left-handed-pitching sample should not determine his entire career valuation. It does support a practical initial deployment: give him the larger share of work against right-handers and preserve opportunities for right-handed corner alternatives.

Carroll hit left-handers exceptionally well in the 2026 split, while Marte also produced far more against left-handers than right-handers. Neither observation requires removing them from regular roles. Nootbaar's smaller left-handed sample was weak. The point of the bench is to improve selected matchups and provide rest without creating more simultaneous jobs than the roster can hold.

Preserve the defensive middle

Perdomo's plus-16 Outs Above Average and Carroll's plus-10 were substantial defensive contributions. Marte finished at plus-4 and Arenado at plus-2. Those results make the existing middle and right-field alignment worth protecting. A first-base addition should fit around that strength rather than force several players into less familiar positions.

The first-base comparison is meaningful but not absolute. Lowe finished at minus-3 OAA, Josh Bell at minus-1 and Ty France at plus-8. France's advantage is part of the case for the more expensive alternative. It is not permission to carry an eleven-out difference forward as a guaranteed future result. Opportunities, positioning, health and year-to-year variation remain relevant.

Jordan Lawlar played 260 major-league innings in center field in 2026. Ryan Waldschmidt played 436.2 there, and Tommy Troy played 120.1. Their center-field assignments are grounded in actual positional work. Troy's reserve second-base role also has support from 211 Triple-A innings at the position. This is a more useful depth plan than assuming that every former shortstop can immediately fill every defensive vacancy.

Keep Moreno behind the plate and manage the workload

Moreno caught 886 innings and supplied about plus-5.1 framing runs. Savant's overall catching value placed him at approximately plus-6.7 runs. Those measures overlap, so they must not be added together as if they were independent contributions. They do reinforce the value of a catcher who also hit well.

The preferred assignment is 115 catching starts for Moreno, 40 for Adrian Del Castillo and seven for Aramis Garcia. Moreno also receives 15 designated-hitter starts. The total 500-PA budget is slightly below his 2026 opportunity. Del Castillo receives 250 plate appearances across catching, designated hitter and reserve work, rather than being asked to replace Moreno's offensive production immediately.

Garcia is organizational depth and would need the appropriate roster transaction before occupying a major-league spot. McCann is a free agent. His prior catching innings cannot be included in the retained plan without a new contract. If Del Castillo cannot handle the backup role, the club must use part of the unassigned reserve on an actual replacement and revise the roster map.

The rotation cannot be financed with optimism

Eduardo Rodriguez supplied 189.2 innings with a 2.89 ERA. Merrill Kelly supplied 162 with a 4.94 ERA and 70 walks. Brandon Pfaadt worked 136 innings with a 3.77 ERA. Those three pitchers provide a substantial starting point, but their results and workloads do not justify treating the remaining starts as a small administrative problem.

Soroka's 3.41 ERA over 116 innings was valuable. His 4.12 expected ERA offers a more cautious reading of the contact, and his season included an August right-arm injury-list stint. The preferred plan offers $8-10 million for one year and budgets 24 starts and 130 innings, subject to medical review. It is a retention decision with a limited commitment, not an assertion that another low ERA is assured.

Zac Gallen's 105.1 innings, 6.07 ERA and 6.64 expected ERA make a rebound purchase harder to price confidently. He is evaluated as a free agent but is not included in the preferred budget. Chris Bassitt is also evaluated without a funded offer. Arizona already has veteran risk and should not add a second uncertain rebound simply to avoid giving young pitchers any work.

Burnes' contract and Burnes' innings are separate decisions

Burnes stayed in his contract, leaving four seasons at $35 million annually, including $11 million deferred each year. His return from elbow surgery lasted three starts before shoulder inflammation. The financial model includes the full $35 million annual allocation. The deferral affects payment timing; it does not turn that obligation into a $24 million player cost.

The main workload plan gives Burnes no opening allocation. That is a conservative planning choice, not a prediction that he will miss 2027 or a medical judgment from outside the club. If he is cleared and builds the necessary workload, the alternative supplies 16 starts and 80 innings. Mitch Bratt, Jose Cabrera, Kohl Drake and Dylan Ray surrender exactly that amount of work.

Mena and Saalfrank also remain outside the opening innings plan after shoulder procedures. Justin Martinez and Drey Jameson receive smaller conditional relief assignments with named replacements. The report distinguishes a verified past injury, a current roster designation and a proposed future workload. None of those alone establishes what a pitcher can safely handle next spring.

Retain the relievers whose skills fit the job

Juan Morillo posted a 2.24 ERA in 64.1 innings, and Brandyn Garcia posted a 1.93 ERA in 51.1. Their success gives Arizona useful internal leverage options. Justin Martinez contributed only 13.1 innings after his recovery, so the plan limits his initial projected role rather than asking him to replace every departing veteran.

Loaisiga's 67 innings, 2.42 ERA, 3.01 expected ERA and 13 walks support a two-year, $16-20 million proposal. The annual allocation is $8-10 million. Ginkel's 4.12 ERA looks less attractive, but his 3.55 expected ERA, 72 strikeouts and 17 walks in 67.2 innings support a one-year, $5-7 million retention. Each receives 60 innings in the preferred plan.

Clarke is a real alternative at $4-6 million for one year. His 2.96 ERA was better than Ginkel's, but his 4.42 expected ERA and 45 strikeouts in 73 innings make the comparison less obvious than the ERA column suggests. Choosing Ginkel at a $1 million higher annual ceiling is a judgment about the job and underlying evidence. It is not a requirement to choose a different name from another club's analysis.

The next wave should earn specific opportunities

LuJames Groover hit .825 in 440 Triple-A plate appearances, walking 53 times against 67 strikeouts. Locklear had an .872 OPS in 302 Triple-A plate appearances before his late-season thumb injury. Troy produced an .878 OPS in 261 Triple-A plate appearances. These are credible candidates for major-league opportunities, with the usual need to account for level, environment and the smaller major-league samples.

The preferred lineup gives Groover 250 plate appearances, Troy 300 and Locklear a conditional 100. It leaves a much larger internal first-base route if no acquisition occurs. Kristian Robinson's 501 Triple-A plate appearances included 145 strikeouts; his next step requires more than citing the .815 OPS. The presence of several candidates creates choices, not a guaranteed replacement for every departing hitter.

Pitching depth is less comfortable. Yu-Min Lin's Triple-A ERA was 5.16, and Ray's was 6.06. Bratt's 3.43 ERA in 63 Triple-A innings is more encouraging, but his major-league record was still limited. The model assigns modest initial roles and shows how sharply they expand if outside pitching is not retained. Lower-level prospects, including Druw Jones, Slade Caldwell and David Hagaman, receive developmental discussion rather than automatic 2027 major-league production.

Test the first-base purchase against the alternatives

Lowe's full 2026 major-league season comprised 429 plate appearances, 17 home runs and a .761 OPS, with .329 actual and .335 expected wOBA. At $6-8 million for one year and 450 planned plate appearances, he offers a defined left-handed role without requiring a major long-term commitment. His Cleveland affiliation is historical after his October 29 free-agent election.

Bell supplies the principal different-candidate test. He had a .738 OPS in 631 plate appearances and the same .335 expected wOBA as Lowe. A proposed $8-10 million one-year ceiling would cost $2 million more at either end. Bell's switch-hitting profile is useful, but the available evidence does not compel that premium for this particular job. His October 30 free-agent election supersedes a lagged Minnesota label.

France is the more expensive Plan B: two years and $24-28 million, or $12-14 million annually. His .865 OPS and plus-8 OAA are attractive, but his .373 actual wOBA was above a .327 expected mark. Arizona should pay for the full offensive and defensive case, not simply buy last season's OPS. Jake Bauers is also evaluated, but his pending qualifying offer and substantially different price requirements keep him outside the funded plan.

Compare repeated targets by the work they would do

Soroka also appears in Cleveland's prepared analysis at an $8-10 million one-year ceiling. Arizona's job is retention for 24 starts and 130 innings. Cleveland's proposed job was a larger outside rotation assignment. The shared price range does not mean both clubs can obtain him, or that familiarity gives Arizona an automatic discount. Both cases depend on the same current medical and market review.

France receives the same $12-14 million annual ceiling used in the prepared Padres and Guardians alternatives. San Diego assigned him 500 plate appearances, replacing work otherwise carried by Sheets, Harris, Wagner, Song and Taylor. Cleveland assigned 450 in place of Goldschmidt and portions of Velazquez and Manzardo's work. Here he takes Lowe's exact 450-PA assignment and the same first-base and designated-hitter starts. Those are different jobs at a common proposed price, not three independently obtainable rosters.

Clarke's repeated appearances elsewhere do not make him the preferred Arizona choice. Ginkel has a clearer current contact-quality case for this bullpen, while Loaisiga supplies a separate 60-inning job. Kittredge and Steven Okert remain alternatives. Their prices are tied to actual innings and handedness needs: $5-7 million for Kittredge or $8-10 million for Okert, with a fresh workload review before assigning either 60 innings.

All proposed additions are free-agent transactions. No outgoing player package is invented. The cost is the stated contract, roster space and any applicable actual compensation rule, not a fictional trade package. The report also tests the internal first-base group and the no-acquisition pitching staff. Those alternatives expose the workload Arizona would need to absorb if its preferred players sign elsewhere.

Start with the existing obligations

The nine listed contracts carry approximately $133.675 million in 2027 salary-plus-allocated-bonus amounts before the Cardinals' $9 million contribution toward Arenado. That contribution is subtracted once, producing $124.675 million for these contracts on the working allocation basis. The table is not a cash-flow schedule or an official competitive-balance-tax calculation.

Burnes' deferrals, Marte's payment timing and allocated signing bonuses require separate treatment in an actual treasury budget. Subtracting a deferral from a salary allocation and then treating the later payment as nonexistent would understate the obligation. The model instead preserves one consistent annual planning basis.

Kelly's agreement includes a 2028 vesting option. Rodriguez also has a future 2028 option and potential buyout. Those future contingencies are not silently added to the 2027 current-buyout line. Gurriel's $5 million buyout and Soroka's $1 million buyout are included in that current provision. A return contract for Soroka would be a new agreement; it would not erase the already-triggered obligation without explicit terms.

Arbitration and uncertainty still consume money

The three retained arbitration estimates total $15.8 million: Nootbaar at $6.3 million, Moreno at $6.1 million and Nelson at $3.4 million. These are published estimates, not signed salaries or official awards. The range for the full roster also includes $12-16 million for pre-arbitration players, minor-league depth and callups.

With Smith's prospective arbitration salary removed after his free-agent election, the existing-roster allocation is approximately $158.48-162.48 million. The same $2.5 million reduction applies to every scenario; the proposed acquisitions and their individual ceilings are unchanged.

The reserve in each acquisition plan is additional to that baseline depth allowance. It is meant for a specific need that emerges after the planned roster is assembled. No unassigned reserve dollar is credited with a hit, out or inning. Once the club uses it, the actual player, contract, roster transaction and displaced workload must be recorded.

Three plans with different costs

Plan A combines Lowe at $6-8 million, Soroka at $8-10 million, Loaisiga at $8-10 million annually, Ginkel at $5-7 million and the $6-8 million reserve. The annual additions total $33-43 million. The two-year Loaisiga proposal makes total new commitments $41-53 million. The preference is to buy a defined first-base job while retaining enough pitching to avoid exposing all of the young depth at once.

Plan B replaces Lowe with France and changes nothing else. Annual additions rise to $39-49 million, with $59-73 million in new commitments. This is the case for paying more for first-base defense and a stronger recent offensive result. The countercase is that France's contact-based offensive estimate was less impressive than his actual season and the extra commitment reduces flexibility elsewhere.

Plan C adds only the $6-8 million unassigned reserve, bringing the total envelope to approximately $164.48-170.48 million. It does not retain Soroka, Loaisiga or Ginkel and does not buy a first baseman. The next sections assign their work to actual internal candidates. A lower bill is a clear advantage; the additional developmental and performance burden is its cost.

Show what changes when one decision changes

The Bell alternative raises Plan A's annual additions to $35-45 million. Substituting Clarke for Ginkel lowers them by $1 million at both ends. Substituting Okert for Ginkel raises them by $3 million. These comparisons exchange one defined role rather than adding every attractive name to the same budget.

Burnes' return changes the workload map, not the existing contract line. The preferred budget already contains his full annual allocation. If he is unavailable, the club still owes the contract and still needs the innings shown in the main plan. If he returns, the young pitchers' assignments shrink by the same 80 innings and 16 starts that he receives.

The main free-agent list also requires actual compensation checks at signing. Bauers' qualifying-offer situation is an evaluated, unfunded branch. It is not imported into Lowe's proposed cost or used to imply that a player without an offer carries the same penalty. Current rules and the player's actual transaction history govern.

A complete 6,200-plate-appearance lineup

The lineup budget gives the established core regular work and creates meaningful opportunities for Waldschmidt, Lawlar, Troy and Groover. Lowe receives 450 plate appearances rather than an unrestricted everyday promise. That leaves a route for Locklear and other right-handed first-base alternatives to earn work while preserving lineup flexibility.

The sum is 6,200 plate appearances. These are season-wide assignments, not sixteen hitters simultaneously occupying active roster places. Options, selection decisions, health and actual performance determine how those opportunities are distributed through the year. No prospect receives major-league output merely because a table needs to reach its total.

Without Lowe, Groover receives 150 additional plate appearances, Locklear 150, Tawa 100 and Del Castillo 50. If Locklear cannot play in the preferred plan, Groover and Tawa replace his limited assignment. If Lawlar is unavailable, Waldschmidt, Troy and Tawa absorb his 350 plate appearances. Those branches preserve the totals while making the increased dependence on young hitters visible.

Cover all 162 starts before counting a recovery

The preferred rotation budgets 30 starts for Rodriguez, 28 each for Kelly and Pfaadt, 24 each for Nelson and Soroka, and 28 combined for Bratt, Cabrera, Drake and Ray. That supplies 162 starts and 870 starter innings. Kelly's proposed 155 innings are below his 2026 total. Pfaadt's 150 are an increase from 136, and Nelson's 125 require a meaningful increase from 87.1.

These are coverage assignments with medical and performance conditions, not forecasts of what each pitcher will deliver. Soroka's 130 innings exceed his 2026 total by 14. Bratt, Cabrera, Drake and Ray still need to earn their opportunities. The club should review the distribution again after actual signings and spring health information rather than treating a balanced spreadsheet as a cleared staff.

Burnes' separate 80-inning return branch reduces Bratt by 30 innings, Cabrera by 20, Drake by 20 and Ray by ten. Their starts decline by six, four, four and two. The reduction exactly matches his addition. A stronger Burnes return would permit another revised allocation; it is not assumed in this initial plan.

Fund the bullpen and expose the internal fallback

The relief budget is 570 innings, bringing the combined staff total to 1,440. Morillo, Garcia, Loaisiga and Ginkel receive 60 each. Justin Martinez receives 45, with a replacement branch if he cannot supply them. Jameson's 25 innings are also conditional. The remaining work is spread across controlled major-league and organizational depth.

The no-acquisition staff replaces Soroka's 24 starts and 130 innings with additional work for Bratt, Cabrera, Drake and Ray. It replaces Loaisiga and Ginkel's combined 120 relief innings with 20 each for Carrillo, Strowd, Burgos, Walston, Lin and Giesting. That is a considerable increase in responsibility for a group with limited or uneven major-league evidence.

The internal map closes mathematically, but its weak points are concrete. Lin's Triple-A control and run prevention need improvement. Carrillo walked 16 in 17.1 major-league innings. Several other relievers have only tiny MLB samples. That is the strongest argument for retaining two established relief options, even when the headline ERA of one of them is less attractive than a cheaper alternative's.

Assign the field and test the run consequences

The defensive map totals 162 starts at every position, including designated hitter, and does not give any individual more than 162 starts across positions. Perdomo remains the regular shortstop. Carroll stays in right field. Waldschmidt and Lawlar share center-field responsibility, with Troy available for coverage. The arrangement gives the younger players defined work without disrupting the club's strongest defensive jobs.

Scoring 25 more runs and preventing 25 would move the simple run-ratio estimate from about 82 wins to 87.5. Scoring 40 more while allowing 20 more reaches only about 84.1. Those are arithmetic illustrations, not player projections or a postseason probability. They show why repairing the offense while allowing the pitching gains to disappear would be an incomplete solution.

The strongest counterargument to Plan A is that Arizona could obtain enough improvement internally, especially from Marte, Nootbaar and the young first-base candidates, while Burnes returns successfully. That path is plausible. Its uncertainty is precisely why the preferred plan keeps the first-base purchase modest and spends the larger share of its additions on preserving pitching coverage.

The decisions that would change the recommendation

Arizona should begin by updating the medical and workload outlooks and confirming the remaining arbitration and option obligations. It should then test Soroka, Loaisiga and Ginkel against the stated price ceilings and alternatives. If the market exceeds those limits, the club needs a revised player-specific plan rather than quietly increasing every estimate until the preferred roster appears affordable.

The analysis uses information checked November 3. Later roster, medical and contract decisions can change both the cost and the available players. Smith's free agency is confirmed, and specific free-agent elections govern when a player still carries his former team label. Historical contributors remain in the evidence tables so the past season can be understood accurately.

The recommendation is to protect the pitching gains and buy a modest improvement at first base. Moreno, Perdomo, Carroll and Marte give the club a credible core. A complete innings plan, honest treatment of Burnes' recovery and defined opportunities for the next group of hitters give that core a better chance to convert another competitive season into a more durable run advantage.